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Abstract 
In this paper we analyse whether it is Pareto Optimal to exclude 
individuals from using a non-pure public good. It turns out that maximum 
Social Welfare is attained either when everybody is allowed to use the 
public good or when just one individual is allowed to use it, depending 
upon the Social Welfare function. These Social Welfare Optima are also 
Pareto Optimal allocations. Whenever restrictions are made with respect 
to equal consumption plans for all users and equal consumption plans for 
all nonusers so-called Restricted Pareto Optima can be attained for 
every number of users. These Restricted Pareto Optima are not always 
also unrestricted Pareto Optima. 
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1. Introduction 
In public goods literature one can find several definitions of a public 
good. Two commonly used characteristics are non-rivalness and non-
excludability. A good is non-rival when consumption by one individual 
does not reduce the benefits to be derived from the good by another 
individual; a good is called non-excludable when nobody can be excluded 
from consumption. In this paper, when talking about a public good, we 
will refer to a good which is non-rival. It is well known that it will 
be Pareto Optimal when every consumer pays for the public good according 
to the marginal utility he derives from it. In other words it is not 
optimal to exclude anybody from using the public good, unless he doesn't 
want to use it anyway. 
Thusfar we have been talking about pure public goods. Things do, 
however, change when the public good is only non-rival up to some 
degree. Think for example of highways: congestion occurs when too many 
drivers are using the highway, I.e., consumption by one individual 
reduces benefits to be derived from the good by other individuals. Now 
it may be Pareto Optimal to exclude some individuals from using the 
public good: if the gains (reduced congestion) outweigh the losses 
(exclusion from the public good of some consumers and consequently a 
drop in utility) this is indeed the case. 
In the literature on these so-called non-pure public goods, one 
of ten runs across the terms club good and club. A club is then a group 
of individuals sharing both costs and benefits with respect to a non-
pure public good. Optimal club size can be calculated, being that club 
size which maximizes total utility of the club members. When the 
economy's population is not fully partitioned into a set of clubs, this 
so-called within-club viewpoint is of course inconsistent with Pareto 
Optimality. To obtain Pareto Optimality utility of all consumers has to 
be considered. Therefore, Artle and Averous [1] and Ng [4] indicated 
that Pareto Optimal membership determination can only follow from an 
objective function which takes into account both members' and 
nonmembers' Utilities (see Cornes and Sandler [3], p. 175). In Cornes 
and Sandler [3] we find a f uil description of this so-called total-
economy viewpoint. In this paper we will only consider the case of 
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homogeneous members (see [3, pp. 176-179]). Maximizing a Social Welfare 
function Cornes and Sandler derive conditions for the optimal provision 
of the public good, the optimal visitation and the optimal membership. 
In this paper we will consider the question whether a membership 
size not including the entire population would be optimal. It does not 
seem very reasonable that in a model with homogeneous individuals, i.e. 
all individuals possess the same tastes, we end up with a result where 
some individuals are excluded from membership. In fact, Berglas, Helpman 
and Plnes [2] have shown that if utility levels are maintained at the 
same level for members and nonmembers, then the quasi-concavity of 
utility assumption forces the club to be inclusive. So, Pareto Optimal 
membership not including the entire population results in discrimination 
with respect to utility between members and nonmembers in a model with 
homogeneous individuals. This seems to be very unlikely. Indeed, we will 
show that a concave Social Welfare function reaches a maximum at a 
membership including the entire population. In case of a convex Social 
Welfare function either the maximum is reached for a club consisting of 
the entire population or for a club consisting of only one individual. 
In the latter case the maximum Social Welfare is attained by benefitting 
only one individual as much as possible. 
In the next section we exposé the model and we derive the first 
order conditions arising from a general social welfare maximizing 
problem. We compare these conditions with the first order conditions 
arising from the club concept, under which it is assumed that both all 
members make equally use of the public good and that nonmembers do not 
use the public good at all. In section 3 we discuss an example in which 
the utility functions of the consumers result in a convex Social Welfare 
function. In section 4 we consider the case that the Social Welfare 
function is concave. We will show that in this case the general welfare 
maximizing problem has a solution in which all individuals are equally 
treated and that this solution also solves the maximization problem 
under the restriction of the club concept. 
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2. The model 
We will consider a model with n consumers, i=l,...,n, one private 
commodity and one public good. Because of the homogeneity assumption all 
n consumers are identical and have the same utility function u1 = 
u(x1,yi,c(y,z)), i=l,...,h, with Sv^/SiJ-X), Sni/8yi>0, Svï/ScKO, and 
where 
xL: quantity of the private commodity consumed by i 
y1: use (visitation) of the public good z by consumer i 
c : congestion function with Sc/Sy>0 and 5c/5z<0 
y : the total use 2^ y of the public good 
z : quantity of public good available. 
According to the club theoretical total-economy viewpoint we assume that 
congestion does not have any impact on the utility of the nonmembers. So 
uCx'Sy^c) - uCx^O.O) whenever yx=0. Furthermore, let the production 
possibilities be given by F(x,z) =» 0. Note that y, not appearing in F, 
does not generate extra costs. Before formulating the general welfare 
maximizing problem we first state some definitions. 
Definition 2.1. An allocation {(x^y1) i»l n, y, x, z} is Pareto 
Optimal if there is no other allocation {(x1,^1) i—1, . . . ,n, y_, x, z) 
yielding a higher utilility for at least one i and at least equal 
utility for all other i. 
Definition 2.2. For some set S of s individuals, a Restricted Pareto 
Optimum is an allocation (x^x-^, yL=yx f °r all ieS, x1=X2, y1=-0 for all 
iCS, y=syi x*=sx-H-(n-s)x2, z) , such that there is no other set S of s 
individuals and an allocation (x^x-p y1==v. f°r a H ï-e±l> x1-^' yh='Q> for 
all igS., y=sy^ x=»sx-^Kn-s)x2. z) yielding a higher utilility for at 
least one i and at least equal utility for all other i. 
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Conditions for Pareto Optimality can straightforward be derived 
from maximizing the following Social Welfare function: 
maximize 2^ a1u(x"L)y:L,c(y,z)) - (M) 
(x\y\z) 
subject to 
x = Z± x1 (2.1) 
y = ^ y1 (2.2) 
F(x,z) - 0 (2.3) 
Assuming that x^O for all i, the necessary first order conditions for 
the optimal quantities of the private good, the public good and the use 
of it become: 
aiSu/5xi - aJSu/SxJ for all 1,j (2.4) 
Su/8yx 5u 5c 5u 
_ < -Si / _ . l y1 :> 0 i=l,...,n (2.5) 
Su/ix1 5c 5y Sx1 
5u 5c 5u SF/Sz 
St / — .< — 1 z > 0 (2.6) 
5c 5z 5xx 5F/5x 
where a<b 1 c>0 means that a,b,c satisfy the complementarity conditions 
a<b, c>0 and (a-b)c-O. Note that, for given i, 5u/5c - 5u(x1,y1,c)/5c 
and hence depends on x1 and y1. 
In the sequel we consider the case that the individuals have equal 
weights in the Social Welfare function, i.e., a1=aJ for all i,j. Then, 
(2.4) becomes: 
5U/5X1 = 5u/5xJ for all i,j (2.4a) 
and hence (2.5) simplifies to: 
Su/Syl < -Sj (5u/5c)(5c/5y) i y1 > 0 i=l,...,n (2.5a) 
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So, all individuals have equal marginal Utilities for the private good, 
while also the marginal utility of the use of the public good is equal 
for all individuals using the public good. 
Suppose that the allocation ((x^.y1) i=l,...,n, x, y, z) solves 
(2.1)-(2.3), (2.4a), (2.5a) and (2.6). Inspèction of the conditions 
(2.4a) and (2.5a) shows some interesting features. Suppose that there 
are two consumers j and h with yp -0, i.e., consumer j is excluded from 
using the public good, and y >0. With the positive number p given by p = 
-S^ (Su/Sc) (Sc/Sy) , the complementarity condition implies that: 
5u/5yh - p, 
and 
5u/5yJ < p. 
So, the marginal utility of the consumer who is excluded from using the 
public good should be less than or equal to the marginal utility of the 
consumer who. can enjoy the public good. Furthermore, the first order 
condition (2.4a) for the private goods consumption says that all 
individuals must have the same marginal utility. It is not unreasonable 
to assume that the marginal utility of the private commodity is 
increasing in the use of the public good and conversely. Assuming that 
marginal utility is decreasing in xL and in y, the above observations 
lead to the conclusion that at a solution {(x^.y1) i=l n, x, y, z), 
x >xp if y^>yJ. So, the consumer with higher use of the public good also 
has a higher private consumption and hence a higher utility level. Since 
we have identical individuals with equal weights in the Social Welfare 
function a solution yielding unequal treatment of the individuals and 
hence unequal utility levels does not seem very likely. 
Within the total-economy viewpoint, in club theory a priori 
restrictions on the maximization problem (M) are stated, namely that 
there are two types of agents, members and nonmembers. Let s (s<n) be 
the number of members. Since, other than the membership, we have 
identical individuals it does not matter which individuals belong to the 
set of members, say S, and which to the set of nonmembers. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that all members make equally use of the public good, 
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i.e., y1=yi for all ieS, whereas the nonmembers are not allowed to use 
the public good, i.e., yL=0 for i€S. Moreover, all members have equal 
private consumption, say x1=x-i, and all nonmembers have equal private 
consumption, say x^Xo. 
Taking all weights in the Social Welfare function equal to one and 
setting u(x,0,0)=u (x), we obtain the following restricted maximization 
problem: 
max s u(x^,y,c(sy,z)) + (n-s) u (X2) (R) 
(x^.xg.y.z.s) 
subject to F(sxi+(n-s)x2,z)=0 
l<s<n. 
The restriction s>l means that a club should have at least one member. 
With 7 and 711 the nonnegative Lagrange multipliers of the inequalities 
s-l>0 and s-n<0 respectively and assuming that z>0, y>0, Xi>0 and xo>0, 
the necessary first order conditions for a Restricted Social Welfare 
Optimum, which is also a Restricted Pareto Optimum, become: 
Sn/Sxl - 5u°/5x2 (2.7) 
Su/Sy - -s(Su/£c)(Sc/Ssy) (2.8) 
(Su/Sc) (Sc/Sz) SF/Sz 
SU/8-X.-L SF/S-x. 
u(x-^ ,y,c)-u (x2) - -s(5u/5c) (5c/5sy)y + 
(2.9) 
+ (5u0/5x2)(Xl-x2) + 7 n - 7 1 (2.10) 
The equations (2.7) and (2.9) correspond to (2.4a) and (2.6) 
respectively, whereas condition (2.8) replaces condition (2.5a). There 
is, however, a significant difference between (2.5a) and (2.8). 
Condition (2.5a) on the use of the public good must hold for all i, 
whereas (2.8) only concerns the use of the public good by the members of 
the club. So, the first order condition (2.8) does not exclude that the 
nonmembers have a higher marginal utility for the use of the public good 
than the members of the club. 
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Gonditions (2.8) and (2.9) can be found in Cornes and Sandler [3] 
as the visitation, respectively provision condition. Taking into account 
condition (2.7) also the membership condition (2.10) is stated by Cornes 
and Sandler, except that in (2.10) also the Lagrange multipliers 7 and 
7 n appear. In fact, these multipliers are equal to zero if s>l and s<n 
respectively, as is indeed assumed by Cornes and Sandler. However, a 
boundary solution with either s«=l or s-n cannot be excluded. In fact in 
the next sections we show that a boundary solution is rule instead of 
exception. 
3. An example 
Two opposite effects play an important role in determining a Pareto 
Optimal allocation. On the one hand quasi-concavity of the utility 
function votes in favour of combinations of goods. Excluding a consumer 
from using the public good causes such a huge drop in utility that it 
seems not to be Pareto Optimal to exclude anyone. On the other hand 
increased congestion can outweigh this effect leading to a Pareto 
Optimum where some individuals are excluded after all. Summing these two 
effects the objective function, as a function of the number of 
individuals allowed to use the public good, may be convex and thus 
generating corner solutions. 
In this section an example will be given which sustains the above 
idea and thus leading to Restricted Pareto Optima which are corner 
solutions in terms of s. Let u(x1,y1,c(Sy1,z)) be given by: 
u(xi,yi,c(Syi,z)) - Jx.1 + xVCy1**"1) 
with c"1(2yi,z)=z/Syi. 
Then we obtain for the members, with x^x-^ and y^-y: 
u(x1,y,c(sy,z)) - J^ + x17(z/s) 
and for the nonmembers, with x^Xn and yx—0: 
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u (x2) = Jx2. 
Furthermore, with x=sx-^+(n-s)x2, assume that F(x,z)=x+z-w, where w is a 
constant number greater than zero. For this example the equal marginal 
Utilities condition (2.7) and the provision condition (2.9) become: 
(X-L)'1^
 + 27(z/s) -(X2)'1/2 (3.1) 
sx1/7(zs) = (xg)"1^ (3_2) 
Using (3.1) the membership condition (2.10) simplifies to 
7(x2/x1) - 1/2 + 2(7n - 71)7x2/(x1 - y(Xlx2)) (3.3) 
with 7n>0 l s<n and 7 >0 ± s>l. Since, because of the form of the 
congestion function, the use of the public good does not show up in the 
utility function the visitation condition (2.8) becomes redundant. 
Taking w-n=»100 the system (3.1)-(3.3) together with F(x,z)=0, has 
three solutions given in table 1 below with U the corresponding social 
welfare. 
table 1 
s x-j^  X2 z u 
1 66.41 0.0074 32.85 397.34 
75 1.00 0.2500 18.75 125.00 
100 0.82 - 17.81 125.34 
Further calculations show that U is decreasing in s for se[1,75] and 
that U is increasing in s for se[75,100]. So, the Social Welfare reaches 
a minimum value at the interior solution s=75. One would indeed find 
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this minimum not checking second order conditions. Furthermore, the 
table indicates that allowing everybody to use the public good (s=n) is 
not to be preferred to allowing just one person to use it: the 
"congestion effect" beats the "qüasi-concavity effect". It should be 
noticed that the optimum shifts with w. In f act, depending on w the 
optimum of (R) is reached at either s=n or s—1 (or both), whereas the 
absolute minimum is reached at s=max(l,min(100,w-25)). 
The example shows that a reasonable utility function u may result 
in a Social Welfare function being convex in s. If so, the optimum is 
reached at either s=l being the minimum number of club members, or at 
s=n, i.e., the club includes the entire population. 
4. Optimum under a concave Social Welfare function 
In this section we consider the case that the Restricted Social Welfare 
function is concave in s. We will show that in this case the 
unrestricted problem (M) has a solution, which also solves the 
restricted problem (R). Moreover, this solution yields equal treatment 
for all individuals, so that a club including the entire population is 
optimal. 
Suppose, we have a symmetrie solution to the system of equations 
(2.1)-(2.3), (2.4a), (2.5a), and (2.6), i.e., we have a solution x£=x* 
and y =y for all i, x=nx , y-ny , z—z . Such a solution has to satisfy 
F(nx*,z*) - 0, (4.1) 
and the first order conditions, which simplify to: 
5u 5c 
Su/Syl £ -n -nSu/Sy X y1 > 0 (4.2) 
5c 5y 
5u 5c 5u 5F/5z 
n — — / — 7 < 1 z > 0, • (4.3) 
5c 5z 5X1 5F/5x 
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Notice that condition (2.4a) is always satisfied in such a solution. So, 
the problem reduces to finding a triple (x ,y ,z ) satisfying (4.1)-
(4.3). Because of the production function (4.1) we may suppose that z 
is a decreasing function of x . 
Taking the usual conditions on the second derivatives of u and F 
to x and z, i.e., 52F/Sz2>0, S2F/5x2>0, S2u/5z2<0, 82\\/5(*?-)2<0, a 
solution (x(y ),z(y )) to (4.1) and (4.3) exists, given some value y . 
Given these values the optimal use of the public good y follows from 
(4.2), if any. A solution does not exist if Su/Sy1 > -nSu/Sy for all 
y =y >0. However, in this case for all y >0 the gain in utility of one 
extra unit of use by one consumer is higher than the total congestion 
loss of utility at any point y 5:0, which implies an infinite use of the 
public good. This unrealistic outcome justifies the assumption that 
Su/Sy1 < -n5u/5y holds for some y^y 5:0. Under this assumption a 
solution to (4.2) exists. So, we may conclude that under reasonable 
assumptions the optimization program has a solution x^x and y^y for 
all i, x=nx , y-ny , z=z . However, this solution is also a solution to 
the restricted maximization problem R with s-n. Because of the 
restrictions, the maximum value of the Social Welfare obtained from (R), 
say maxR is less than or equal to the maximum value resulting from 
maximizing M, say maxM, i.e., maxR<maxM. On the other hand we have shown 
ï "k 
that under reasonable assumptions maxM is reached for a solution x =x 
and y^y for all i, x-nx , y-ny , z-z . Clearly, with s-n, x^ =-x , y=y , 
and z=z (X2 does not matter because s-n) , this is a solution to (R) 
with maxR-maxM. So, the problem (R) results in a solution with the 
entire population as the optimal membership size. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In the previous section we have shown that, if the Restricted Social 
Welfare function is concave, it is optimal to include the entire 
population in the club. Moreover, the solution is also a solution to the 
unrestricted problem and hence it yields a unrestricted Pareto Optimum. 
However, although a club including the entire population maximizes the 
Restricted Social Welfare function, this result does not imply that 
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clubs not including the entire population cannot yield a Restricted 
Pareto Optimum. On the contrary, we may have that there is a Restricted 
Pareto Optimum for any club size s. 
To show this, let s be a fixed number of club members and let 
X]_(s) , y(s) , X2(s) and z(s) be a solution to F(x,z)=0 and (2.7)-(2.9), 
given s. Then these quantities are optimal given the club size s. 
Suppose that these quantities do not yield a Restricted Pareto Optimum. 
Since all individuals are identical the allocation cannot be dominated 
by forming another club of size s. Now, suppose there is a dominating 
allocation with club size s.<s. Then, at least one club member is 
excluded in the new situation and becomes a nonmember. Since all 
nonmembers have equal utility and the individual being excluded must 
have an utility at least equal to the utility of the members in the old 
situation, in the new situation all individuals must have an utility at 
least equal to the utility of the members in the old situation. However, 
under this equal utility condition it is shown in Berglas, Helpman and 
Pines [2] that it is optimal to include the entire population. So, if 
the allocation can be dominated by decreasing the club size, then it is 
also dominated by including all individuals. 
Now, suppose there is a dominating allocation with club size s>s. 
So, at least one nonmember becomes a member of the club and must get the 
same utility as the members, while both the original members and the 
remaining nonmembers must get the same utility as in the old situation. 
Since the nonmembers only derive utility from the private good 
consumption, their quantity Xo must be at least.equal to X2(s). So, the 
new members, bringing in their quantity X2(s) of the private good, must 
be able to compensate the old members for the increase of the 
congestion, while their own utility becomes equal to the utility of the 
members. Since we argued before that X2(s)<x-i(s) this is not possible. 
So, in general we have that for any s, l<s<n, the optimal quantities 
x-^(s), y(s) , X2<s) and z(s) yield a Restricted Pareto Optimum. 
Recapitulating, we have that for a concave Social Welfare function 
s=n yields an optimum, which is both an unrestricted Pareto Optimum and 
a Restricted Pareto Optimum. Furthermore, for arbitrary s (<n) the 
optimal quantities x-^(s), y(s), X2(s) an z(s) yield Restricted Pareto 
Optima. However,. these Restricted Pareto Optima are not always (also) 
-12-
unrestricted Pareto Optima. Whenever a nonmember has higher marginal 
utility for the use of the public good than a member, that is whenever 
(2.5a) does not hold for nonmembers, Pareto improvements can be made if 
nonmembers are allowed to become a marginal member. If so, a Restricted 
Pareto Optimum is not an unrestricted Pareto Optimum. 
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